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MARRIOTT v. MARRIOTT

SURVIVING SPOUSE'S STATUTORY SHARELEGISLATIVE CHANGE
Marriott v. Marriott, et al.1

The testator died on July 13, 1937, leaving a will and
codicils thereto which were admitted to probate and letters
testamentary granted thereon to the executor named in the
will. The deceased left both real and personal property.
The latter, after payment of taxes, debts and administration expenses, amounted to a net personal estate of approximately $20,000.00. The decedent was survived by
his widow, the appellant, but left no child, descendant, parent or brother or sister of him surviving. He did, however, leave surviving a number of nephews and nieces, all
of whom were mentioned in the will. He made no devise
or bequest to his widow, and upon his decease, by timely
notice in writing to the executor, she claimed her legal
share of his estate, including a $2,000.00 allowance
2 as provided by the statute of distribution in intestacy.
After a meeting of the distributees of the estate, held
in pursuance of the statutory requirement," the Orphans'
Court of Baltimore City passed an order directing the distribution of the estate, ordering that the widow be entitled
to one-half of the personal estate of the deceased in addition to the widow's statutory4 allowance of seventy-five
dollars and that she not be entitled to the additional sum
of $2,000.00 as claimed. It was from this order that the
widow appealed. Held, affirmed. The Court of Appeals
held that where a testator leaves only nephews and nieces
surviving him, all of whom were provided for in his will,'
and leaves nothing to his surviving spouse, who elected to
take her legal share, such surviving spouse was not entitled, in addition to one-half of the deceased's personalty,
1

3 A. (2nd) 493 (Md. 1939).
'Md. Code Supp., Art. 93, Sec. 127.

a Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 148.

Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 318.
The nephews, who were specific legatees likewise appealed from the
order of the Orphans' Court, which, by reason of the assertion by the
widow of her claim, apportioned the consequent diminution of the testator's
estate among the specific and the residuary legatees alike, and thereby
ignored priority to the specific legatees. The order of the Orphans' Court
on this point was reversed, the Court of Appeals holding the specific
legatees were entitled to be first paid out of the net estate after the
widow's rights had been ascertained and satisfied. See Marriott v. Marriott, et al., 3 A. (2d) 493, 498-502 (Md. 1939).
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to $2,000.00, because the statute6 applies only in cases of
intestacy whereas in the instant case the decedent died
testate.
Under the Testamentary Law Act,7 as it stood at the
date of this case, in all cases of intestacy in which the deceased was not survived by child or decedent or parent or
brother or sister or child of a brother or sister, the surviving spouse received the whole of the personal estate.'
In event, however, the intestate was survived by a child or
descendant, the surviving spouse received one-third.' And
in the event there was no child or descendant but a father
or mother, the surviving spouse received one-half; however, if there was no parent in such a situation but the
deceased was survived by a brother or sister, or child or
descendant of a brother or sister, the surviving spouse
received $2,000.00, or its equivalent in property at its appraised value, and one-half of the residue of the surplus.10
It was the construction of this latter provision 1 ' which gave
rise to the appeal of the widow. The widow-appellant contended that because of the fact that she was: ignored in the
will of her deceased husband, he died intestate as to her,
and that, therefore, her claim in her husband's estate
should be adjusted and settled as though he died intestate.
Section 311 of Article 93 of the Code limits the time and
directs the manner in which a surviving spouse may renounce a devise or bequest, or both, and elect to take in
lieu thereof, respectively, a dower in the lands and legal
share of the personal estate, or a legal share in both the
real and personal estate; in which latter case the share of
the renouncing spouse, if the deceased spouse be not survived by descendants, shall be "one-half of the lands, as
Md. Code Supp., Art. 93, Sec. 127.
Md. Code, Art. 93. The first comprehensive system of testamentary
law was enacted in this State in 1798, and while various amendments have
since been made to certain provisions of the original Act, in so far as the
share of a widow is concerned the Act of 1798 remained unchanged down
to 1933 (the passage of Chap. 386 of the Acts of 1933, repealed and reenacted Section 127) except that under the provisions of Sections 317 and
318, the widow was given a special allowance of $150 and $75, as the case
may be, whether the deceased spouse died testate or intestate. Other
legislation, however, has enlarged her rights in real property of her deceased husband, still reserving to her the right of dower, upon her election
as provided by the Act. See Md. Code, Art. 93, Sees. 125, 126, 127 (Supp.),
310, 311, 314, 317, 318, as amended, Md. Laws 1939, Chs. 498, 499, 501. See
also Md. Code, Art. 46, Sees. 2, 3, 4.
Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 125.
Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 126.
10 1Md. Code, Supp., Art. 93, Sec. 127.
S bid.
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of the surplus personal estate . . .
an heir, and one-half
2
and no more."
The question, therefore, which the Court of Appeals
had to decide in the instant case was whether the surviving
spouse took under Section 127 of the statute of distribution
in intestacy 13 or under the above Section 311, relating to
the rights of a surviving spouse who renounces the provisions of a will.
In Harris v. Harris,4 the Maryland Court of Appeals
had definitely decided that the statute of distribution in intestacy had no application where a decedent left a will.
Therefore, it seemed clear to the Court that Section 127"
affected estates of intestates only and, in the face of the
express language of the Testamentary Law Act,' 6 it could
not be held to relate to estates in which the decedent had
executed a will. They reasoned that, in the case of intestacy, the decedent has indicated no discrimination against
his surviving spouse and therefore the Legislature by Section 12711 had directed that the surviving spouse in cases
of intestacy should be more liberally dealt with. The
Court of Appeals indicated that had the Legislature intended to apply the same liberality to the estates of testates
in those cases where the widow was ignored, it could, and
doubtless would, have said so.
Such result was caused, if not compelled, by the incomplete provisions of the existing statute law. The effect of
the decision was short-lived. The Legislature of 1939 has
given more exact expression to the legislative intent by
allowing the surviving spouse to take the same share re"In connection with the problem raised by Sections 311 and 127 of
Article 93, Sections 310 and 314 should also be considered. Section 310
provides that "every devise of land or any estate therein, or bequest of
personal estate to the wife of the testator shall be construed to be intended
in bar of her dower in lands or share of the personal estate, respectively,
unless it be otherwise expressed in the will." Section 314 is as follows:
"But if in effect nothing shall pass by such devise, she shall be thereby
barred whether she shall or shall not renounce as aforesaid . . .". It is
well settled by the Maryland decisions that in all cases wherein a testator
makes no provision in his will for his widow, no renunciation by her is
necessary as a condition precedent for her to sustain her claim for common
law or statutory rights. See, Hokamp, Erx'r., v. Hagaman, 36 Md. 511
(1872) ; Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 129 Md. 455, 99 A. 672, L. R. A. 1917 D,
464 (1916) ; Barroll v. Brice, 115 Md. 498, 80 A. 1035 (1911) ; Harris v.
Harris, 139 Md. 187, 114 A. 909 (1921) ; Kuykendall v. Devecmon, 78 Md.
537, 542, 28 A. 412 (1894).
"Md. Code Supp., Art. 93, Sec. 127.
"139 Md. 187, 114 A. 909 (1921). See also, Hokamp v. Hagaman, 36
Md. 511 (1872).
" Md. Code Supp., Art. 93.
"Md. Code, Art. 93.
' Md. Code Supp., Art. 93.
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gardless of whether he or she claims in intestacy, in defeasance of an express provision for him or her in the will,
or in defeasance of a will which makes no provision for
him or her.18 This seems a simple, practical, and satisfactory solution, because the spouse's need for support
is the same in all three cases.1 9
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This, the latest treatise in the field of Constitutional
Law, is one of the Hornbook Series, and, while it suffers
necessarily from the limitations imposed by the endeavor
to discuss such a subject in Hornbook fashion, it is nevertheless a scholarly and thorough piece of work.
The author has confined himself practically entirely to
a discussion of the Federal Constitution, with only occasional references to principles of State constitutional law,
and has approached his subject along conventional analytical lines. After a general and overly brief discussion
of the legal function of constitutions and the doctrine of
judicial review, he takes up in order the doctrine of separation of powers, the relationship between the federal and
state governments and interstate relations, the powers of
the federal government (in which the amending power is
included and under which limitations on State powers are
discussed), and the protection afforded individual rights
against governmental action.
2s See Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 499, an act to repeal and re-enact with amendments Section 311 of Article 93, changing the law of distribution in certain
cases of election of a husband or wife where the will of the decedent is
not accepted by the survivor; Aid. Laws 1939, Ch. 498, an act repealing and
re-enacting with amendments Section 314 of Article 93, changing the law
in cases where the will of a husband or wife makes no provision for the
surviving spouse. See also Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 501, adding a new section
to Article 93 to be known as Section 84 A, providing for the execution of
a deed to real or leasehold property or any interest therein, whenever any
surviving spouse shall be entitled thereto under the provisions of either
Section 127, Section 311 or Section 314 of Article 93.
'1 Note that the provisions of Sections 310 to 314, relating to the rights
of widows in the estates of their husbands, apply equally in favor of the
surviving husband, so as to give to him the same rights in the estate of
his deceased wife, which said Sections 310 to 314 give to widows in the
estates of their deceased husbands. See Md. Code, Art. 93, See. 326.

